State of Utah v. David Davis : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. David Davis : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Sandra L. Sjogren; assistant attorney general; attoreys for
appellant.
Stephen R. McCaughey; attorney for respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Davis, No. 890003 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1504
v i M n u v u n i v»r MrrcALO 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 





E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 890003-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY; 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE ROBERT L. NEWEY, PRESIDING. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
72 East Fourth South 
Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
OCT 121989 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 890003-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY; 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE ROBERT L. NEWEY, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN (4411) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellant 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
72 East Fourth South 
Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1AHI.F OF AUTHORITIES 
J1.1H j •-.111 1' r 11 1 NATURE OF PRO 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRLSFN,, / , " 
STATEMENT OF THF CASt 
STATtMtNi 1 'MM i^r'V'\ 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSE WA!i PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL UNDER RUl.H 4',)', 404(b) 
AND 609(e)(1 ) 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) 7-10 
State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989) 9 
State v. Featherson, No. 880091, slip op. at 3 (Utah 
Sept. 26, 1989) 5 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987) 6 
State v. Gotschall, No. 870294, slip op. at 6-7 (Utah 
Oct. 5, 1989) 5-6 
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 7-8, 11 
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (1986) 2 
Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-3 (Supp. 1989) 1 
Utah R. Evid. 103 (1989) 9 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1989) 1, 3-5, 7 
Utah R. Evid. 404 (1989) 2-5, 7 
Utah R. Evid. 609 (1989) 2, 4, 7-8, 10 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ( 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
17 4 
V • < 
DAVID DAVIS, i 
Defendant/Appellant. i 
t Case No. 890003-CA 
t Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of a second degree 
felony in the Second District Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Should the trial court have suppressed evidence of 
defendant's previous conviction for drug distribution in his 
trial for another charge of drug distribution where the evidence 
was relevant and more probative than prejudicial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSf STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1989)t 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant/ evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Bvid. 404(b) (1989)i 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Utah R. Bvid. 609(a) (1989)t 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with distribution of a 
controlled substance, cocaine, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986). A jury 
convicted defendant as charged on August 26, 1988, with the 
Honorable Robert L. Newey presiding. Judge Ronald Hyde imposed a 
one to fifteen year prison term on defendant on December 2, 1988. 
Judge Hyde stayed the sentence, placed defendant on probation and 
ordered him to attend the Odyssey House Program. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State agrees with the Statement of Facts contained 
in defendant's brief except that beginning with the last two 
sentences on page 3 of that brief, defendant's characterization 
of the trial court's oral ruling on the motion to exclude the 
evidence of defendant's prior conviction is somewhat confusing. 
Judge Newey divided the issue into two parts; 1) whether the 
State would be allowed to use defendant's prior conviction for 
impeachment purposes, and 2) whether the State could offer 
evidence of defendant's prior conviction in its case in chief to 
explain defendant's presence in the jail and to set the context 
of the informant's offer to arrange the drug transaction with 
defendant (T. 10). He ruled that he would admit the evidence in 
the State's case in chief because it was more probative than 
prejudicial, and that more harm would occur if the jury 
speculated on why defendant was in jail at the time he met the 
State's informant than would occur from telling them what he was 
convicted of (T. 10-12). He stated that he would instruct the 
jury vigorously not to use the prior conviction as evidence that 
defendant committed the offense charged here (T. 12). He also 
ruled that the evidence could be admitted to impeach defendant 
because the prior conviction was so recent and his resulting 
status as a probationer was a motive to be less than truthful 
about this offense (T. 11-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court admitted the evidence of defendant's 
prior conviction in the State's case in chief rather than during 
defendant's own testimony. Thus, the initial analysis is 
appropriately undertaken under rules 403 and 404(b). Under these 
rules, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
evidence because it was relevant to establish why the informant 
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approached defendant and why defendant trusted the informant 
enough to engage in a drug transaction. Even if the evidence was 
inadmissible under these rules, its admission was harmless where 
the court actually limited the jury's use of the evidence to 
impeachment only and it was proper impeachment under rule 
609(a)(1). Alternatively, the evidence was harmless in any event 
as it is unlikely that the result of the trial would have been 
different without its admission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSE WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL UNDER RULES 403, 404(b) AND 
609(a)(1). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of 
his prior conviction for distribution of cocaine. The trial 
court admitted the evidence over defendant's objections because 
it was relevant to the State's case, more probative than 
prejudicial, and proper impeachment. Based upon this ruling, the 
State elicited testimony from its first witness, the informant 
Mario Trujillo, that defendant told Trujillo he was in jail for 
selling cocaine (T. 72). Thus, the evidence actually came before 
the jury based upon the court's ruling that the evidence was 
relevant to the State's case and more probative than prejudicial. 
Later on in the trial, Judge Newey notified counsel 
that he intended to instruct the jury that the evidence could be 
used for impeachment only (T. 181-83). On appeal, defendant 
argues that the court erred in admitting the evidence as 
impeachment. He ignores the ground on which the evidence was 
-4-
admitted, perhaps because the trial court's instructions to the 
jury limited the jury's use of the evidence. Nevertheless, the 
evidence did not come before the jury in the traditional 
impeachment process, and it is necessary to discuss whether the 
Judge's admission of the evidence during the State's case in 
chief was appropriate. The limitation of the jury's use of the 
evidence is relevant to the issue of whether admission of the 
evidence was harmful, if it was error. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1989) allows admission of other 
crimes for "purposes[] such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident." Admission of other crimes under rule 
404(b) is limited by Utah R. Evid. 403 (1989) if the probative 
value of the other crimes is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Gotschall, No. 870294, slip 
op. at 6-7 (Utah Oct. 5, 1989); State v. Featherson. No. 880091, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah Sept. 26, 1989). The decision of the trial 
court to admit such evidence is discretionary and should not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Gotschall, at 7. There 
is no abuse of discretion unless the error in admitting the 
evidence, if any, was harmful. Ld. 
In this case, defendant conceded that the jury was 
entitled to know that the informant met him while the two were in 
jail (T. 8-9). Defendant objected, however, to the jury being 
informed of the reason he was in jail: that he had been 
convicted of selling cocaine. The State, on the other hand, 
argued that the evidence was integral to its case because its 
theory was that Trujillo approached defendant for this deal 
because he knew that defendant had previously engaged in selling 
drugs, that defendant trusted Trujillo because they were both in 
jail for cocaine distribution, and that the cocaine deal 
consequently occurred as Trujillo said it did (T. 7). The 
State's need for this evidence is illustrated by defendant's 
theory that he was simply agreeing to invest Trujillo's money and 
that Trujillo set him up by bringing the cocaine to the park 
himself and making it appear as if defendant brought it to sell 
to Trujillo (T. 156-59, 165). 
The State agrees that generally, prior convictions for 
the same or similar offenses should be excluded where there is no 
legitimate use that the jury could make of the evidence or where 
the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs their probativeness. 
See State v. Gentry/ 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). While the issue 
is not entirely without doubt, the trial court did not err in 
admitting the evidence. Cf. Gotschall, slip op. at 7 (admission 
of evidence of prior bad acts that were relevant to defendant's 
state of mind not error, though not without doubt). The court 
correctly concluded that the evidence was relevant to establish 
the State's case. Its refusal to exclude the precise nature of 
the prior conviction was not an abuse of discretion where 
defendant conceded that the jury could be told that defendant was 
in jail with Trujillo and where the jury was carefully instructed 
to use the evidence only in judging credibility (R. 55, 56) 
(copies in appendix A). Furthermore, the prosecutor specifically 
asked the jury not to use the fact that defendant had been 
convicted previously of selling cocaine to convict him of this 
charge (T. 254-55) (copy in appendix B). For these same reasons, 
even if it was error under either Rule 403 or 404(b) to admit the 
testimony about the reason for defendant's incarceration, it was 
harmless. 
A determination of whether admission of the evidence 
was harmless, also requires examination of whether the evidence 
was admissible for impeachment under Utah R. Evid. 609 (1989). 
Defendant argues first that the evidence was not admissible under 
Rule 609(a)(2) because the sale of cocaine does not involve 
dishonesty or false statement. The State agrees that it did not 
establish that defendant's conviction for selling cocaine 
involved dishonesty or false statement and, therefore, concedes 
that the conviction was not admissible or admitted under rule 
609(a)(2). See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Rule 609(a)(1) provides that a defendant's prior 
conviction can be elicited on cross-examination if it was 
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year and its 
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Defendant 
complains that his conviction was unfairly prejudicial and that 
its probative value did not outweigh the prejudice. The 
arguments offered by defendant in favor of suppression of his 
conviction cut both ways and render the question a close one, but 
do not establish an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of 
defendant's conviction. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 
(Utah 1986). 
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Defendant first complains that the court did not 
explicitly follow the five factors enumerated in Banner to guide 
the court's exercise of discretion. He claims that the court's 
failure to make a finding on all five factors requires reversal 
under Wight. Defendant's analysis of Wight and Banner is 
erroneous. 
This Court found that the lower court erred in Wight 
because it admitted the prior conviction under 609(a)(2) and the 
crime was not one that inherently qualified for admission under 
that section, 765 P.2d at 17-18. The Wight trial court did not 
engage in balancing of probativeness against prejudicial effect 
because it did not consider admissibility of the evidence under 
Rule 609(a)(1) at all. This Court implied in Wight that it would 
have considered the admissibility of the evidence under 609(a)(1) 
if there was any record on which it could have reviewed the 
court's decision, 765 P.2d at 19. Because there was no record 
upon which to determine if balancing would have resulted in 
admission of the evidence, this Court declined to find that the 
evidence was admissible under rule 609(a)(1) and proceeded 
instead to a harmless error analysis. 
In contrast, while the trial court here did not express 
that it was relying on Banner, it articulated its reasons for 
admission of the evidence on the record after engaging in a 
balancing process (T. 10-13). As defendant notes, these reasons 
fit the first three of the five Banner criteria. The other two 
Banner criteria deal with the importance of credibility issues in 
the particular case and the importance of the defendant's 
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testimony, 717 P.2d at 1334. These are factors which this Court 
can review from the trial record regardless of whether the trial 
judge articulated findings on them. Notably, defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of his motion only discussed the three 
Banner factors that he complains that the court limited its 
ruling to (R. 34). Defendant should not be heard to complain on 
appeal that the trial court erred in this regard where he did not 
raise the issue below nor object to the form of the court's 
ruling. State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah 1989); Utah 
R. Evid. 103(a) (1989). 
Defendant's prior crime was admissible under the second 
Banner criteria because it was a recent conviction for which he 
remained on probation and which provided him with a very strong 
motive to fabricate an explanation for his presence at the scene 
of his arrest and for his possession of the marked money provided 
for the drug buy. Basically, the trial court found that the 
importance of the jury knowing of this motive was strong enough 
to outweigh factors one and three that the conviction was for 
exactly the same offense and had no per se relevance to his 
character for veracity. 
Defendant chooses to construe the fourth Banner factor 
regarding the importance of credibility in a case "without 
decisive nontestimonial evidence,M Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334, in 
a way which favors only exclusion of the prior conviction. He 
states that his credibility was important because the State's 
case relied upon the testimony of other persons, thus, his 
conviction should have been suppressed. Yet, defendant's 
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possible lack of credibility was important to the State for the 
very same reason that his credibility was important to him. He 
had a strong motive to fabricate and Trujillo was subject to 
impeachment for his motive to fabricate to obtain early release 
from jail. Weighing these competing interests, this Court should 
conclude that defendant's potential lack of credibility weighed 
in favor of admission of the evidence. 
It is also true that defendant's testimony was 
important in this case to establish his theory of the case, the 
fifth Banner factor. There were apparently no other witnesses 
who were privy to the arrangement between defendant and Trujillo 
who could testify that Trujillo tricked defendant into thinking 
that the money in Trujillo's gym bag was for investment rather 
than a ruse to implicate defendant in a drug deal so that 
Trujillo could obtain an early release from jail. This factor 
alone does not require reversal of this case where other factors 
weigh in favor of admission and it was not an abuse of 
discretion, therefore, to admit the evidence. 
Finally, even if it was error to admit the evidence 
under Rule 609(a)(1), it was harmless. Because an abuse of 
discretion under rule 609(a)(1) does not reach constitutional 
proportion, the error would be reversible only if after review of 
the record there was a reasonable likelihood of a different 
result. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335. Here it is unlikely that the 
result would have been different because defendant agreed that 
the jury could be informed that he met Trujillo while in jail. 
Furthermore, the jury was instructed to use the evidence for 
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evaluating credibility only and the State did not argue that the 
evidence should be used for any other purpose. Indeed, the State 
insisted that the jury use the evidence only for impeachment 
purposes and succinctly explained in lay terms that 
[y)ou shouldn't say, look, I don't even want 
to bother with the evidence, this guy was 
once convicted of it, he is guilty as sin and 
I don't even have to look at the evidence. 
And that's what the Judge is trying to 
emphasize to you, don't do that, and I'm 
telling you not to do that. 
(T. 255). He continued by explaining how to use the evidence to 
determine credibility: 
Say look, this is the word of a person with 
that background, with that conviction, do 
I — can I believe him? That's a proper area 
for you to consider his prior conviction in 
evaluating his credibility. 
(T. 255). Because the court carefully limited the jury's use of 
the conviction despite its ruling that it was admissible for 
other purposes, any error in its admission was harmless. The 
result of the trial would not likely have been different even 
without admission of the evidence. See Wight, 765 P.2d at 19-20. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12-th day of October, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
//SANDRA L^S^pGRBN 
/ / Assistant Attorney General 
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INSTRUCTION NO. l¥ 
The fact that a witness had been convicted of a felony* 
if such be a factr may be considered by you only for the purpose 
ot determining the credibility ot that witness. The fact of 
such conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair the 
witness1 credibility. It is one of the circumstances that you 
may take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such a 
witness. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1% 
Evidence of a defendants previous conviction of a 
felony i s to be considered by the juryr only insofar as i t may 
affect the credibi l i ty of the defendant as a witness/ and must 
never be considered as evidence of gui l t of the crime for which 
the defendant i s on trial* 
APPENDIX B 
254 
baking soda and then it's boiled. 
So you — now, this is — this is the part where 
you're not — you're not obligated by anything, you can justj 
say, look, this is — this is how I interpret it in light 
of the facts, in light of what happened, that "it's in the 
mixM you can say, look, when you consider everything, "it's 
in the mix" considering this stuff is mixed and then boiled, 
that's — it's more reasonable and more rational to conclude! 
9 J it that way for you than to say, well, "it's in the mix", 
10 that the weed is coming, that the defendant — that's the 
11 defendant's version that he testified to. "It's in the 
12 mix." 
13 J Now, this — this is your domain, credibility, and 
14 decide which version when you have conflicting versions — 
15 and we often do — of what happened, this is where you 
*• I decide who to believe, how much to believe. You can 
believe some or all of the witnesses' testimony or if you —| 
you can believe, as the judge read to you in the instruc-
19 J tions, if you found that he was—he lied about a certain 
20 thing, you can disregard his entire testimony. You can 
21 reject it. This is the domain, the traditional domain of 
M the jury, credibility. 
23 Now, credibility is, again, discussed and the judge 
24 J emphasizes that to you and it was brought out during the 





defendant's prior conviction, that you shouldn't just out 
of hand reject his testimony because he has been convicted 
of — of a similar offense before — the same offense be-
fore. You shouldn't say, look, I don't even want to bother 
with the evidence, this guy was once convicted of it/ he is 
guilty as sin and I don't even have to look at the evidence. 
And that's what the Judge is trying to emphasize to you, 
don't do that, and I'm telling you not to do that. And I 
know you'll be conscientious in looking over the evidence 
before you arrive at a verdict and that you were not pre-
judiced out of hand against the defendant and that — that 
you will consider conscientiously the facts. 
That's all we ask of you, and that's what the Judge 
emphasized to you, how to — how to value his credibility. 
And the Judge says you can use that conviction when you say, 
okay, there's a conflict in the story. Who do I believe. 
Let's weigh his version against the other version, the 
opposing version, as we heard from the State's witnesses. 
Now, this is where the instruction says you can consider it 
in credibility. Say look, this is the word of a person 
with that background, with that conviction, do I — can I 
believe him? That's a proper area for you to consider his 
prior conviction in evaluating his credibility. Read the 
instructions, if you like. 
The deal is set up, the money is given to Mario, the 
